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"Common Sense Legal Reform"
and Bell's Toll: Eliminating
Punitive Damage Claims from
Jurisdictional Amount Calculations
in Federal Diversity Cases
BY RUSSELL G. MuRPHY*
INTRODUCTION
The 1995 swearing in of Newt Gingrich's 104th Congress marks the
beginning of another phase in the longstanding debate about the proper
role of the federal courts. The Republican "Contract with America!'
contains litigation reform proposals that would limit punitive damage
awards. The recently released Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts carries the Contract's attack on punitive damages one step further
by advocating the elimination of punitive damage claims from jurisdic-
tional amount calculations in diversity of citizenship lawsuits in the
federal courts. These legal and political developments offer an opportuni-
ty to re-evaluate the impact of punitive-damage-based diversity cases on
the operation and effectiveness of the federal court system.
The diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the federal courts has long
been a source of controversy. Although expressly created by the United
States Constitution,' Congress has consistently conferred it with signifi-
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A. 1966, University of
Massachusetts at Amherst; J.D. 1973, Suffolk University Law School
This Article would not have been possible without the inspiration, support and
assistance of Paul R. Sugarman, former Dean of Suffolk University Law School, Professor
Kate Nace Day of the Suffolk law faculty, and Professor and past Associate Dean Charles
Kindregan. The Author owes special thanks to Professor Bernard Ortwein and Professor
Michael Rustad for their review of the Article. The author is very grateful for the research
assistance of former students James Grace, Deborah House, Anissa Burke and Scott
Altonian. Thanks also to Suffolk University Law School Dean John R. Fenton, Jr. for
providing institutional support.
L U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2 ("The judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend
to ... Controversies ... between citizens of Different States ... [and] between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.").
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cant restrictions,2 and the United States Supreme Court has narrowly
construed implementing legislation.3
The Access to Justice Act4 submitted to Congress in 1992 contained
significant proposals for reform of federal court practice? One provision
would have excluded punitive damage claims from the calculation of the
jurisdictional amount in diversity lawsuits.6 The proposal was defeated,
and its sponsors did not resubmit similar legislation.7 However, the issue
of punitive damages has been revitalized by the Republican "Contract
with America,"' legislation proposed to implement the Contract's "tort
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988) (imposing ajurisdictional amount requirement of
$50,000 exclusive of interest and costs); id. § 1441(b) (1988) (stating removal of state
cases to federal courts is available "only if none of the parties ... joined ... as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which [the] action is brought").
' See, e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 105-09 (1941)
(declaring that the right to remove a state case is limited to the named defendant; original
plaintiff facing counterclaim may not remove); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267, 267 (1806) (construing diversity statute to require "complete diversity" in that no
plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any defendant).
4 H.R. 4155, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Seas. (1992)
(providing for the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in certain cases,
including diversity cases); cf. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1993, S. 585, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (providing for the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in diversity
cases to discourage frivolous lawsuits).
'See Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 568 (1992)
(commenting on the Access to Justice Act). Section 2 of the Senate version of the Access
to Justice Act required that the jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 be
indexed on an annual basis to reflect the change in the Consumer Price Index. S. 2180,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1992). The Act also provided that the prevailing party in
diversity actions shall be entitled to attorney's fees to the extent that he or she prevailed
on the claim. Id. § 3. In addition, the Act imposed a notice requirement on potential
plaintiffs seeking to file suit in federal district court. Id. § 5.
6 S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Ses. § 2 (1992). Section 2 provided for an amendment
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, adding a new section: "(d) In determining whether a matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, the amount of damages for pain and
suffering or mental anguish, punitive or exemplary damages, and attorney's fees or costs
shall not be included."
'Telephone Interview witif Staff Member, Offices of Senator Charles E. Grassley
(Oct. 13, 1993) (stating that the bills were not resubmitted because of a "change in
priorities' and "lack of interest." This staff person seemed reluctant to discuss whether
the change in presidential administrations detened resubmission.).
' The "Contract with America!' was signed by 345 Republican candidates on
September 27, 1994. Among the ten promises for legislative action within the first one
hundred days of the 104th Congress was a pledge to implement "common sense legal
reform" including "reasonable limits on punitive damages.' The Coming Attack,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Final Makeover Edition), Nov. 22, 1994, at A8.
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reform" agenda,9 and the 1995 recommendations of the Committee on
Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States.l0
The prominence of punitive damages reform in these plans highlights the
burdens placed on federal courts by diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
based on punitive damage claims and calls for limitation or abandonment
of this type of jurisdiction.
This Article examines the rule of Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance
Society, that punitive damage claims may provide the jurisdictional
amount required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 even if the damage claim is facially
excessive, 2 in the context of modem diversity practice. After a review of
the history of diversity jurisdiction and summary of its major criticisms, 3
the Article outlines the remedy of punitive damages, 4 describes the
primary issues in the debate over their viability and legality,"5 and
examines how jurisdiction based on punitive damages disrupts the proper
functioning of federal courts. 6 The Article concludes with a recommenda-
tion that either the Supreme Court or Congress reverse Bell and adopt a
rule that the jurisdictional amount in diversity cases be calculated without
regard to punitive damage claims. 7
I. FEDERAL COURT DIVERSrrY oF CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION
Federal courts possess jurisdiction to hear cases and controversies
between citizens of different states under Article H, Section 2, of the
United States Constitution." Congress has implemented this constitutional
grant by legislation dating back to the first diversity statute, the Judiciary
Act of 1789.19 These laws and their interpretation by the United States
9 H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Section 103(c) of Title I of H.R. 10
provided for punitive damage awards only upon clear and convincing proof of conduct
manifesting actual malice. Such damages were limited to the greater of three times actual
damages awarded for economic injury or $250,000.
10 CoMMrrEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrED
STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOP. THE FEDERAL COURTS (1995).
u 320 U.S. 238 (1943).
n Id. at 243 (stating that decisions on whether a party meets the jurisdictional
amount requirement will not be made based on the assumption that a verdict for the
claimed amount would be excessive).
n See Infra notes 18-65 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 66-159 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 160-223 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 224-38 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 239-58 and accompanying text.
* See supra note 1.
'9 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (1789); see supra note 2.
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Supreme Court have imposed restrictions and limitations going signifi-
cantly beyond the express terms of the Constitution. Two of the most
important restrictions are the jurisdictional amount requirement20 and the
"rule of complete diversity."'
These restrictions reflect both historical reservations about the need
for federal diversity jurisdiction and concerns about the effects of
diversity on the capacity of federal courts to perform essential functions.
Commentators have asserted that diversity jurisdiction has outlived its
usefulness.' overwhelms the federal docket with routine state matters,
The Judiciary Act of 1789 created 13 districts and 13 district courts. Judiciary Act of
1789, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. at 73. The Act also created three circuit courts and endowed them
with original jurisdiction over the following:
all suits of a civil nature ... where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclu-
sive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States
are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between
a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State.
Id. §§ 4, 11, 1 Stat. at 74, 78. The Act only endowed the 13 district courts with
jurisdiction to hear, inter alia, cases concerning federal law, admiralty, aliens, cases where
the United States was a plaintiff, and cases involving suits against foreign ministers. Id.
§ 9, 1 Stat. at 77.
o The jurisdictional amount requirement is currently $50,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(1988).
' See supra notes 2 and 3. Under this rule, all of the plaintiffs must have state
citizenship different from the state citizenship of all the defendants.
2 See generally Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (Apr. 2, 1990),
reprinted in 22 CONN. L. REV. 615, 733-942 (1990) (setting forth the proposals,
analyses, and recommendations of a committee appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Congress which conducted a fifteen month study of the problems of the federal courts).
The Committee concluded that "in most diversity cases ... there is no substantial
need for a federal forum." Id. at 779. The Committee recommended that Congress limit
diversity jurisdiction to complex multi-state cases, inteipleader, and cases involv-
ing aliens. Id. at 778. Martha Middleton, Judge Urges Ending Diversity Jurisdiction,
68 A.B.A. J. 252, 252 (1982) (reporting remarks made by Judge Wilfred Feinberg, Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, endorsing a bill
which "would eliminate diversity of citizenship as a basis for federal jurisdic-
tion!').
' Report, supra note 22, at 778-89; see also M. Caldwell Butler, Diversity in the
Court S ystem: Let' Abolish It, 3 ADELPHIA L.J. 51, 54-56 (1984) (asserting that diversity
cases constitute roughly twenty-five percent of the federal courts' caseload and roughly half
of such cases involve primarily state matters of tort and contract); Erwin Chemerinsky &
Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 90, 94
(asserting that federal question and diversity cases constitute two-thirds of the district
court docket; arguing for line drawing in diversity cases to limit access); Diana G. Culp,
Fixing the Federal Courts, 76 A.BA J. 63, 63 (1990) (asserting that, in recent years,
federal courts "have been transformed primarily into drug courts and courts of death-penalty
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drains off severely limited resources,24 and interferes with the federal
courts' ability to decide crucial federal law cases.25
A. Justifications, Criticisms and Reforms
Diversity cases are state law cases over which state and federal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction.26 The primary contemporary justification
for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is that it eliminates or reduces the
potential for state court bias, prejudice, or unfairness against out-of-state
litigants.27 At various times, commentators have asserted that diversity
review").
' See, e.g., Report, supra note 22, at 780 ("The problem is not merely that diversity
cases misuse federal judicial resources. It is that they misuse a lot of federal judicial
resources."). For example, it is not uncommon for a plaintiff to bring a diversity action
in a federal district court that is, for the most part, similar to a suit already pending in a
state court. Roger J. Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptions
for Relief, 51 ALB. L. REV. 151, 154 (1987). 'When one of the two courts enters a
judgment on the case, the doctrine of res judicata operates to terminate the suit in the
other court, and thus, renders useless the judicial resources expended by the second court.
Id.
2' See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 141
(1973) ("The first and greatest single objection to [diversity jurisdiction] is the diversion
of judge-power urgently needed for tasks which only federal courts can handle or which,
because of their expertise, they can handle significantly better than the courts of a state.");
cf. Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens
of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1674-75, 1687 (1992) (arguing against diversity
jurisdiction because it forces federal courts to intrude upon the sovereign right of state
courts to make state law). See Report, supra note 22, at 780 (asserting that the "primary
role" of federal courts is to "litigat[e] federal constitutional and statutory issues!).
2 See Miner, supra note 24, at 155 (noting the problems created in diversity cases
when there is no state decision on point: "the federal court must predict what the highest
state court would do when confronted with the question!). A plaintiff's choice of forum
will be driven by tactical and strategic factors. When the choice is for federal courts, such
courts fumction for the private interests of the litigant, rather than to advance important
national policies or principles. See generally GEORGE C. HOLT, THE CONcuRRENT
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS §§ 23-24 (photo. reprint 1980) (1988)
(noting general principles of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction). The existence of
concurrent or shared state and federal court jurisdiction is at the core of many of the
problems generated by diversity jurisdiction.
' Report, supra note 22, at 778-80. See generally Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) ("Whe [C]onstitution itself... entertains
apprehensions" on the impartiality of state courts); FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 146-50
(labeling bias against out-of-state parties as the only substantive justification for diversity
jurisdiction); Henry . Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv.
L. REv. 483, 492-99 (1928) (noting that while a bias justification was put forth in state
1995-96]
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has been required to do the following: solidify or enhance the powers of a
national/central government; create better staffed and funded forums to
hear the more complex cases brought in diversity; promote expansion to
the western United States by providing neutral forums for private railroads;"0
provide stability for the growth of commerce;3' offer protection against state
court reliance on debtor-oriented state legislatures;32 and strengthen state
courts and lawyers practicing in those courts through exposure to federal
procedures and federal judges'
The Federal Courts Study Committee Report contained a comprehensive
critique of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. In 1990, the Committee
concluded that:
-the diversity docket amounts to over 50,000 cases annually and accounts
for twenty-five percent of the civil case load of the federal courts;34
- these cases are generally routine lawsuits in contract or tort that result in
a disproportionately high number of trials 5 and one of every ten ap-
peals;36
- costs for handling diversity cases exceed $130 million annually, more than
ten percent of the federal judicial budget;37
-diversity lawsuits generate complex procedural andjuisdictional problems;
conventions on ratification of the Constitution, there is a paucity of cases showing such
bias by state judges).
's See ALI, STUDY OF TEE DiIVSION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COuRTS 101 (1969); FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 141.
29 See FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 146.30 MITCHELL WENDELL, RELATIONS BETwEEN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 93
(1968).
31 See, e.g., Miner, supra note 24, at 153.
32 Report, supra note 22, at 778.
' FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 144-46; see also John P. Frank, Diversity Jurisdiction:
Let's Keep It, 3 ADELPEIA L.J. 75, 82 (1984) (considering the advantages, criticisms, and
effects of diversity jurisdiction and noting widespread state emulation of federal rules of
procedure).
' Report, supra note 22, at 778; see also Butler, supra note 23, at 54 (quoting
Hearings on H.. 6691 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8,
97, 125 (1982)); Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 97, 99-101
(discussing the impact of diversity jurisdiction on federal caseloads).
11 Half of all civil trials are routine contract or tort lawsuits. See Report, supra note
22, at 778-79.
36 Id.
' See id. at 778, 780; Culp, supra note 23, at 64.
31 See Butler, supra note 23, at 54 (discussing a number of "Erie problems" that a
federal court must resolve in diversity actions before addressing the substance of the claim
[Vol 84
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- the lack of precedential effect of state law rulings in diversity cases
creates inconsistencies in the interpretation of state law, contradictory
results in similar cases, and state-federal friction. 9
Diversity jurisdiction is particularly difficult to justify when the
mobility of American society, together with the internationalization of
commerce, trade, and business, seem to have substantially reduced the
fear of state court bias that constitutes a primary rationale for this
jurisdiction. Even if there are isolated instances of favoritism toward in-
state parties, the Federal Courts Report concludes that diversity jurisdic-
tion interferes with the federal court's capacity to decide federal law
cases, civil and criminal4 This problem grows in severity as Congress
steadily expands federal question jurisdiction.4'
Broad-based diversity jurisdiction also presents a threat to healthy
federalism by exacerbating the tensions created by a dual court system.42
Under contemporary Erie43 practice, tensions arise from the difficulties
(Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal courts are to apply
the law of the state in diversity cases except in cases involving a question concerning the
United States Constitution or an act of Congress)); see also Report, supra note 22, at 784-
85 (noting complex issues associated with diversity jurisdiction, such as choice of law,
statutes of limitations, removal, and joinder).
3' Report, supra note 22, at 781; see also Kramer, supra note 34, at 104.
° See Report, supra note 22, at 778-80 (noting the drain on federal judicial resources
caused by diversity jurisdiction). See generally FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 22-26
(discussing the plethora of federal statutory rights and causes of action over which federal
courts have jurisdiction).
"' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). "Federal question'
jurisdiction embraces claims arising under federal law, civil and criminal; see, e.g.,
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995) (creating
federal court jurisdiction over claims brought under the Americans with Disability Act);
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993)
(applying compelling governmental interest test to substantial state burdens on the
exercise of religion and countering the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-86 (1990) (rejecting compelling state interest test in free
exercise of religion challenges to generally applicable criminal laws)); Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28, 28 (1988) (expanding
the scope of federal anti-discrimination action statutes); Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 60008, 108 Stat. 1796, 1971-1972
(1994) (creating a new federal offense for the indiscriminate use of weapons to further
drug conspiracies); id. §§ 60003, 60005-60015, 60018, 108 Stat. at 1968-1975
(categorizing offenses for which the federal death penalty may be imposed as punish-
ment).
42 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
4' Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal courts sitting
1995-96]
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cited by the Federal Courts Report" as well as the confusion generated
by federal court certification of state law issues4 Diversity jurisdiction
thus unduly interjects federal courts into purely state matters while
seriously disabling those courts from meeting intensifying needs to decide
federal law cases.
Reform proposals have been offered by scholars," federal judges,47
the Federal Court Study Committee," and political leaders. 49 The
Federal Court Study Committee Report proposed that Congress legisla-
tively prohibit in-state plaintiffs from invoking diversity jurisdiction,"
treat corporations as citizens of each state in which they are licensed to
do business,"' exclude pain and suffering, attorney's fees, mental anguish
and punitive damages from the jurisdictional amount,52 and raise the
jurisdictional minimum to $75,000 or higher.53
The Access to Justice Act would have limited the damages to be
considered in pleading the jurisdictional amount to "economic" damag-
es.' For jurisdictional purposes only, the Act excluded claims for pain,
in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state where the court sits; state
substantive law includes legislation and court decisions).
"See supra notes 34-40.
4s Approximately three-fourths of states allow various state and federal courts to
certify questions of state law to the state's highest court. See, e.g., UNIF. CERTIFICATION
OP QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 1, 12 U.LA. 52 (1967) (amended 1994); see Ira P.
Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for Reform, 18
J. LEGIS. 127, 139-51 (1992). Federal court certification most often occurs when a
question of state law is presented in a federal diversity case, the question may be
determinative of the case, and "it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling
precedent in the decisions of [the state's highest] court." MASS. Sup. JUD. CT. R. 1:03;
see also ALI STUDY, supra note 28, § 1371(e) (describing the certification process and
related problems). Statutes and rules are collected in 17A WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2D § 4248 (1988) (discussing certification to state courts).
"See, e.g., Butler, supra note 23, at 51, 70-73 (advocating abolishment of diversity
jurisdiction except in cases involving interpleader, alienage, and multiparty injury actions);
Culp, supra note 23, at 64.
47 See generally FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 141-52; Middleton, supra note 22, at
252; Sloviter, supra note 25, at 1674-75.
"See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Quayle, supra note 5, at 559, 568, 569.
50 Report, supra note 22, at 781 (arguing that in-state plaintiffs have no colorable
claim of state court bias).
"' Id. at 782. Thus, the in-state plaintiff rule would apply to a corporation in every
state where it does business. Id.; see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
Report, supra note 22, at 782.
53 Id.
' Access to Justice Act of 1992, supra note 4, § 2.
[Vol. 94
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suffering, and mental anguish, attorney's fees and punitive damages."
Another provision indexed the jurisdictional amount by requiring that the
amount automatically increase by annual percentage increases in the
Consumer Price Index.5' Thus, under the Act, the amount would go up
gradually and consistently rather than sporadically according to Congres-
sional whim.'
Other reforms in the Act included the following: adoption of the
"fairness" rule for the award of attorney's fees;58 creation of "multi-door
courthouses" in the form of alternative dispute resolution systems and
plans; 9 imposition of a 30 day notice of "intent to sue" requirement as
a prerequisite to the filing of a federal court case; and restoration of
full immunity to state court judges.6 '
In March 1995, the Committee on Long Range Planning of the
United States Judicial Conference announced 101 recommendations for
limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts "to allow the trial and appellate
courts to continue to operate into the next century and to preserve the
core values of the federal court system."' The Conference, although
approving most of the recommendations, elected to defer consideration
of measures that would limit federal court jurisdiction, including the
elimination of diversity jurisdiction.63
53 Id.
Id. Congress has always relied on cumulative changes in the Consumer Price Index
in raising the jurisdictional amount. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1958) (increasing the jurisdictional amount in controversy from $3000 to $10,000 in
cases concerning federal questions or diversity of citizenship and also fixing the
citizenship of a corporation in the state in which it was incorporated or its principle place
of business). Congress is notoriously slow to act on required changes in the jurisdictional
amount. In 1988, Congress accounted for inflation and added a cushion to the amount out
of concern that it might not '"revisit the issue for another three decades." H.R. REP. No.
889, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 45 (1988); see also Thomas F. Baker, The History
and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy Requirement: A Proposal to "Up the Ante"
in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.R.D. 299, 324-25 (1983) (discussing numerous increases
in the jurisdictional amount).
See Access to Justice Act of 1992, supra note 4, § 2.
5' Id. § 3 (reimbursing the prevailing party for attorney's fees up to the amount of
attorney's fees incurred by the nonprevailing party).
'9 Id. § 7.
'o Id. § 5 (suggesting that the purpose of written notice of claims and damages is to
act as a facilitator of settlement).
"Id. § 9.
"Judicial Conference Approves, Defers Recommendations in Long Range Plan, BNA
PENSIONS & BENEF1rS DAILY, June 9, 1995, at D12.
3Id.
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This Article examines a narrow but important component of these
reform proposals: elimination of punitive damages in the calculation of
the jurisdictional amount in diversity cases. The Article proceeds on the
premise that the more radical restructuring of diversity jurisdiction
proposed above is desirable and supportable."4 However, such reform
can only be accomplished by comprehensive legislation that has not been,
nor will likely be, forthcoming. In comparison, the limitation offered in
this Article can be easily accomplished by a targeted amendment to 28
U.S.C. § 1332 or judicial reconsideration of Bell v. Preferred Life
Assurance Security.65
B. Jurisdictional Amounts and Punitive Damages
1. The Role of Jurisdictional
Amounts in Diversity Jurisprudence
Short of the complete abolishment of diversity or enactment of the
more sweeping reforms proposed by the Report of the Federal Court
Study Committee," the Access to Justice Act,' and various schol-
ars," the jurisdictional amount is currently the exclusive Congressional
mechanism for limiting the flow of state law cases into the federal
CourtS.
69
4 See, e.g., supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1332); supra note 11 and accompanying
text (discussing Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Sec., 320 U.S. 238 (1943)).
' See, e.g., Report, supra note 22, at 778-79 (proposing the elimination of diversity
jurisdiction except for interpleader, complex multi-state litigation, and suits involving
aliens). See generally Victor Flango, How Would the Abolition of Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction Affect State Courts?, 74 JUDIICATURE 35 (1990) (measuring the impact of the
abolishment of diversity jurisdiction on a state by state basis).
See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of the Act).
Butler, supra note 23, at 74 (proposing the elimination of federal diversity
jurisdiction); Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 23, at 94 (proposing setting priorities
that would exclude certain diversity cases); Culp, supra note 23, at 64 (proposing that
federal diversity jurisdiction be abolished except in cases involving complex multistate
litigation, interpleader, and suits with aliens as parties).
A jurisdictional amount has been statutorily required since the first diversity
statute. Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 19, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78. From that statute's $500
threshold, Congress raised the amount to $2000 (1887), $3000 (1911), $10,000 (1958),
and the current $50,000 (1988). Judicial Inprovements and Access to Justice Act, Pub.
L. No. 100-702, § 201, 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332). See
generally Baker, supra note 56, at 304-18 (discussing the original jurisdictional amount
and subsequent increases, excluding the current $50,000 amount).
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The essential purpose of the jurisdictional amount is to screen out
minor, trivial, unimportant state cases." Its importance is demonstrated
by the steady increase in the minimum amount from $500 in 1789 to the
$50,000 figure set in 1988.71 The Federal Court Study Report described
the function of ajurisdictional amount as limiting "federal court intrusion
into everyday lawsuits .... 72 To the extent that federal court diversity
effectuates important governmental interests, the jurisdictional amount
channels only substantial cases to the federal courts, leaving "run-of-the-
mill" lawsuits to the states. It is a "pragmatic but essentially arbitrary
attempt to limit the diversion of federal courts from their primary role of
litigating federal constitutional and statutory issues."73
Allowing punitive damages to be considered in meeting the jurisdic-
tional amount undermines its "doorkeeper" function and defeats legisla-
tive intent.74 This is especially true in reference to the prevailing United
States Supreme Court construction of such intent. The Court has ruled
that a case will not be dismissed unless it appears "to a legal certainty
that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount . .. ."" It
has also decided that "the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the
claim is apparently made in good faith." '76 This flexible standard dilutes
the power of ajurisdictional threshold. The approach to punitive damages
established in Bell in 1943 combined with the "to a legal certainty" test
of St. Paul renders the jurisdictional amount requirement almost meaning-
less.
Judge Abner Mikva aptly described the jurisdictional amount in this
regime as a "kind of puffing game that you play with lawyers.77 As
noted by the Federal Courts Study Committee, "parties seek to inflate
their claims to come within the $50,000 minimum" and use punitive and
other noneconomic damages to "skirt the jurisdictional minimum."'78 The
Bell rule leads to speculative or inflated punitive damages claims,
aggravates the problems identified with punitive damages as a remedy,
'" Cf. Report, supra note 22, at 778 (noting that the jurisdictional amount was
established to keep everyday lawsuits in state courts).
71 See supra note 69.
S eport, supra note 22, at 778.
7' Id. at 780.
' See infra notes 88-159 and accompanying text.
7 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938).
76 Id. at 288.
7 Court Reform and Access to Justice Act: Hearings on H.R. 3152 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 312, 313 (1988) (statement of Hon. Abner J. Mikva).
n Report, supra note 22, at 780, 782.
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and results in federal courts deciding minor, insignificant, and frivolous
state cases.
2. Bell
Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Society79 established the basic
test for the use of punitive damages to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount requirement in diversity cases. According to Bell, "[w]here both
actual and punitive damages are recoverable under a complaint each must
be considered to the extent claimed in determining jurisdictional
amount."80
The complaint in Bell disclosed actual damages of $202.35, the
amount the plaintiff paid for an insurance certificate allegedly
fraudulently sold by the Society's agent, and consequential damages of
$1000, the maximum value of the policy."1 The inclusion of a claim for
unspecified punitive damages brought the amount claimed to $200,0002
which was found to be sufficient to support diversity jurisdiction83 under
a diversity statute requiring a jurisdictional amount in excess of
$3000.' The Court relied heavily on the fact that state law authorized
punitive damages under the circumstances of the case.85 However, over
time the most critical aspect of the Court's holding was Justice Black's
refusal to dismiss the case based on "the assumption 'that a verdict, if
rendered for that amount [$200,000], would be excessive and set aside for
that reason . .... "" He observed that such "'a statement ... could
not.., be judicially made before such a verdict was ... rendered."'"
Bell introduced a bright line test for federal court diversity, jurisdic-
tion: punitive damage claims, if authorized by state law and requested in
good faith, may be used to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement.
The requirement is met even if it can be determined before trial that such
damages, if awarded, would be excessive and require a trial judge to set
a verdict aside or order a remittitur after trial.
-' 320 U.S. 238 (1943).
' Id. at 240 (citing Banry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 560 (1886) and Scott v.
Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 89, 90 (1897)).
"t Bell, 320 U.S. at 239-40.
82 Id. at 240.
Id. at 240, 243.
u 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1875) (amended 1911).
85 Bell, 320 U.S. at 241-43.
86 Id. at 243 (citing Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886)).
17 Id. (citing Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886)).
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3. Bell in Operation
In the past few years a growing number of federal courts have
decided issues involving the impact of punitive damage claims on federal
court jurisdiction and practice. These decisions strongly support the
proposal advanced in this Article by pointing out the dangers of cases
structured around punitive damages.
In the 1993 case of Capstick v. Allstate Insurance Company,' the
plaintiff sued his insurance company for refusing to pay a claim for
the value of his car after it was destroyed by fire. 9 The company
treated the claim suspiciously partly because its agent failed to re-
port that witnesses confirmed the insured's claim that the fire was
an accident. ° A federal court jury awarded $1500 in compensatory
damages for the actual value of the car, a 1982 Chevrolet Celebrity,91
$3000 in consequential damages, and $2 million in punitive damag-
es for the company's "bad faith" handling of Capstick's
claim.Y
Neither the trial nor the appellate courts questioned subject
matter jurisdiction. Counsel for the defendant insurance company
made no motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, even though
maximum provable damages were $4500. The Court of Appeals,
applying Oklahoma's punitive damages standard of "wanton or reckless
disregard of plaintiff's rights,"93 upheld denial of defendant's trial
and post-trial motions attacklng the punitive damages award, and
refused to order a new trialU4 Both the court and counsel accepted
jurisdiction on seemingly exaggerated claims for punitive damages.
This deference by the court and counsel is a primary influence of
Bell.95
"S 998 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1993).
'9 Id. at 812.
o Id. at 814.
"Id. at 813.
12Id. at 812.
n Id. at 816 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1987)).
r4 Id. at 819-23.
Capstick contains a lengthy review of the propriety of the trial court's instructions
to the jury on the Oklahoma standards for the various categories of damages awards, its
rulings on post-trial motions, and the conformity of Oklahoma law to United States
Supreme Court constitutional requirements for jury awards of punitive damages. Id. at
815-23. Such analyses by federal courts are required precisely because trial court and
counsel fail to address the preliminary jurisdictional issue of the adequacy of jurisdictional
amount claims.
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Another 1993 case, Schieb v. Grant,96 based jurisdiction solely on
a claim of punitive damages. The complaint in Schieb alleged a violation
of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968"7 and a claim for punitive damages under the Illinois Eavesdrop-
ping Statute." The trial court entered summary judgment for the
defendants, two attorneys and a guardian ad litem, on both counts." It
concluded that Title M did not reach the unauthorized parental taping of
a minor child's telephone conversations through an extension line in the
parental home,' and that attorneys and court appointed guardians were
immune from the civil sanctions authorized by the Illinois Eavesdropping
Statute to the extent that alleged violations of the statute involved actions
reasonably related to ongoing litigation."'
On the state law claim, the court noted that it possessed jurisdiction
based on diversity and the claim for punitive damages." Citing Bell,
the court took jurisdiction even though it concluded that "any award in
excess of $50,000 would be excessive and likely set aside .... 103
Factually, the state law claims in this case related to the defendant's
disclosure, in connection with state custody proceedings, of portions of
two tape recorded phone conversations between the plaintiffs' minor son
and his mother.' In the court's view, even though punitive damages
for such disclosures could not lawfully exceed $50,000, jurisdiction
would exist by the mere pleading of such damages."05
Capstick is an example of the extensive review of trial procedures relating to proof
of punitive damages required by Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)
(rejecting an insurance company's due process challenge to an award of punitive
damages). The test for punitive damages under OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1987), requires
acts amounting to "oppression, gross negligence, malice, or reckless and wanton disregard
of plaintiff'srights." Capstick, 998 F.2d at 818. This standard was met because plaintiff
suffered "mental distress, inconvenience, annoyance and expense" because Capstick had
to "convince Allstate that ... [he] was not an arsonist'; every night he would "go to
sleep thinking about this situation!' and how it put "turmoil" in his life. Id. at 816.
814 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. IM. 1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 320 (1994).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
"ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 14-1 to 14-9 (1991).
'9 Schieb, 814 F. Supp. at 740-41.
' Id. at 738-40.
.01 Id. at 740-41.
" Id. at 740 n.2. The court failed to consider supplemental jurisdiction over the state
claim based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. V 1993). See infra note 128 (describing
principles of supplemental jurisdiction).
113 Schieb, 814 F. Supp. at 740 n.2.
4 Id. at 737-38.
'0' See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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In Sharp Electronic Corp. v. Copy Plus, Inc.,16 the district court
concluded that "any recovery of punitive damages was highly unlikely to
be sufficient to bring the recovery within the jurisdictional prerequisite"
of $50,000 °7 and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Copy
Plus had sued Sharp in a Wisconsin state court for the return of monies
used to purchase three copiers and two sorter bins after Sharp terminated
a distributor agreement with Copy Plus."l Copy Plus requested com-
pensatory damages of $15,000, unspecified damages for loss of customer
good will, and punitive damages. In response to a request for admission,
Copy Plus denied that the value of its various claims totalled less than
$50,000. It stated that "[d]epending upon the amount the jury awards for
punitive damages, recovery may exceed $50,000, but that is not readily
ascertainable at this time."""
Sharp then filed a federal court suit to stay the Wisconsin case and
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act."' The trial court
dismissed the case on a finding that plaintiff Sharp claimed "'to be
subjected to more damages than [Copy Plus] ... claims to be seek-
ing."' "' On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed because Copy Plus
had "acknowledged that more than $50,000 could be at stake" in its
response to the admission request."' Punitive damages were available
under state law and it could not be said that such damages would be
excessive."4 Even though the trial judge's dismissal strongly suggested
an excessive claim, Bell seemed to prohibit that inquiry.' 5 Sharp thus
indicates that the mere availability of punitive damages makes diversity
jurisdiction automatically available."6
16 939 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1991).
'07 Id. at 515.
' Id. at 514.
109 Id.
110 Id.
"' Id. See also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) (authorizing a district court to order arbitration
if it has jurisdiction over the case).
112 Sharp Elee. Corp., 939 F.2d at 514.
" Id. at 515.
114 Id.
"s See id. (stating that the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of
the claim because Bell required more deference to the plaintiffs' claims for punitive
damages).
116 See id. (upholding jurisdiction where punitive damages are available under
state law and a verdict for more than the jurisdictional amount would not be exces-
sive).
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Capstick, Scheib, and Sharp are hardly anomalies.'17 The plaintiffs
in Rodriguez v. American Cyanamid Company"' purchased three
Combat indoor fogger "bug bombs," distributed by American Cyanamid,
for use in their new mobile home. The instructions warned users to turn
off flames and pilot lights prior to activating a bomb. Plaintiffs set off the
foggers while a stove light was burning. Within minutes, there was an
explosion and fire that destroyed the mobile home, which was valued at
$14,000, nd its contents, which were valued at $6500.""
Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in federal district court against various
defendants alleging claims under strict liability, negligence, breach of
warranty, and punitive damages.' No subject matter jurisdiction
challenges were made. Rather, partial summary judgment was awarded
on (1) state product labeling claims based on a finding that the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")"' preempted
state law causes of action ' and (2) negligence per se claims because
FIFRA does not create private rights of action." However, the case
was allowed to proceed on the punitive damages claim. Under Arizona
law, punitive damages are available where "'defendant's wrongful
conduct was guided by evil motives .... [P]laintiff must prove that
defendant's evil hand was guided by an evil mind.""' 24 This must be
proven by "clear convincing evidence."'"
Plaintiffs alleged that American Cyanamid had knowledge of "prior
incidents of fires and explosions involving the Combat Room Fogger
product," but continued to distribute the product with "knowledge or
... Rodriguez v. American Cyanamid Co., 858 F. Supp. 127, 131 (D. Ariz. 1994)
(maintaining jurisdiction after denial of defendant's motion for partial summary judgment
on the issue of punitive damages, even though actual damages were far short of the
jurisdictional amount); Wagner v. Ohio Bell Tel., 673 F. Supp. 908, 910 (N.D. Ohio
1987) (upholding jurisdiction where punitive damages ame allowed under state law and a
verdict in the amount necessary to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement would not be
excessive); Diana v. Canada Dry Corp., 189 F. Supp. 280, 281 (W.D. Pa. 1960)
(upholding diversity jurisdiction based on plaintiffs' claim for damages because to
determine to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover claimed amount the court
"would have to put itself in the place of the jury").
1,8 58 F. Supp. 127 (D. Ariz. 1994).
9 Id. at 128.
'Id.
m 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
m 858 F. Supp. at 128.
3 Id. at 131.
Id. (quoting Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 578 (Ariz. 1986)).
'' Id. (quoting Thompson v. Better-Bilt Alum. Prod. Co., 832 P.2d 203, 210 (Ariz.
1992)).
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conscious disregard that the product was dangerous.""12 The record was
found to create a jury issue on punitive damages.'27
The court's opinion made no reference to the amount of punitive
damages claimed. The case was not pleaded as a supplemental jurisdic-
tion"' action even though one might have been asserted on the alleged
private right of action in FIFRA.1 The case remained in federal court
on the highly questionable conclusion by the court that the facts raised a
jury question under Arizona's stringent punitive damages tests. 3
Bell extends so far as to establish jurisdiction even though "[w]hen
all the proof is in the trial judge may conclude that jurisdiction never
existed."131
"AId.
127 Id.
' See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1993). Supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over
factually related state law issues in a well-pleaded federal law case may be asserted without
reference to the $50,000 jurisdictional amount imposed in diversity of citizenship cases. See,
e.g., Lindsay v. Kvortek, 865 F. Supp. 264, 271-76 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (discussing federal
supplemental jurisdiction). The Lindsay case represents a dangerous potential expansion of
punitive damage based diversity jurisdiction. It construes the recently amended supplemental
jurisdiction statute to extend jurisdiction over a claim that does not meet the $50,000
jurisdictional amount so long as other parties in the case present such claims. Id. at 272-76
(analyzing recently amended 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and case law interpretation); see also Patterson
Enter., Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1152,1154 (D. Kan. 1993) (upholding
federal supplemental jurisdiction over claims by other plaintiffbecause the claims involved the
same facts and were controlled by the same legal issues); Garza v. National Am. Ins. Co, 807
F. Supp. 1256, 1257-58 (M.D. La. 1992) (exercising supplemental jurisdiction based on 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) over claims that did not independently meet the amount in controversy
requirement). Under this analysis, plaintiffs may use punitive damage theories to inflate one
party's claim and then piggyback into federal court additional claims by other plaintiffs even
though such claims do not meet the jurisdictional minimum.
' See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 553-56 (1989) (holding that the Federal
Tort Claims Act does not allow exercise of pendent party jurisdiction over additional parties
over whom no basis for federal jurisdiction exists), superceded by statute, Scott v. School Dist,
815 F. Supp. 424,428 n.l0 (D. Wyo. 1993); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,725
(1966) (authorizing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over state claims that arise from the
same common nucleus of facts as valid federal claims), overrded by statute, Scott v. School
Dist, 815 F. Supp. 424,428 n.10 (D. Wyo. 1993); see also Lindsay v. Kvortek, 865 F. Supp.
264,276 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an amended claim based
on the amended 28 U.S.C. § 1367 even though the court lacked original diversity jurisdiction
because plaintiff failed to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement).
-o Supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
" See Diana v. Canada Dry Corp., 189 F. Supp. 280, 281 (1960) (citing Bell, 320
U.S. 238 (1943)); see also Goldberg v. N.V.R. Mort., No. 92-56624, 1994 WL 127186,
at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 1994) (determining that addition of a punitive damages claim to
a case seeking actual damages of $15,600 confers diversity jurisdiction).
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In Mullins v. Hany's Mobile Homes, Inc.," the district court
denied a motion to remand a case removed from a state court in which
plaintiff sought $17,995 in compensatory damages for a defective mobile
home purchased from the defendant, damages for some portion of the
$1,381.44 finance charge, unspecified damages for "aggravation,
annoyance and inconvenience,"" and punitive damages." Plaintiffi
offered to settle for $45,000."' Relying on its "common sense"136 and
Sharp Electronics," and acknowledging that the removal statute "is to
be construed strictly against removal,"'3 the court refused to find to a
legal certainty that the damages did not exceed $50,000.139
Cadek v. Great Lakes Dragaway"" presents a contrasting result.
The District Court first concluded that punitive damages were not
available under Wisconsin law on the facts alleged.' Such damages
could be recovered for fraud only if the defendant's actions were "'willful
and wanton, in reckless disregard of [the plaintiff's] rights or interests
... , ,," Plaintiff alleged that he had paid a fee to race his car at
defendant's race track, observed a fire engine parked on the track's
premises, and concluded that the engine was properly manned and
operating to combat fires. Unbeknownst to him, the engine was inopera-
tive. Plaintiff's car was involved in a crash during the race; this car, and
another owned by him, were destroyed by fire.'4 ' From these facts
plaintiff argued that Great Lakes Dragaway intended to induce him to
believe that adequate fire safety equipment was on site and to rely on that
representation in paying the racing fee.'"
-z 861 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. W. Va. 1994).
13 Id. at 23.
m Id. at 23-25.
13' Id. at 23.
36 Id. at 24.
"7 Sharp Elec. Corp. v. Copy Plus, Inc., 939 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1991). Spra notes
106-16 and accompanying text.
"3 Mullins, 861 F. Supp. at 23.
" Id. at 23-26.
'40 No. 93 C 1402, 1994 WL 449284 (N.D. M11. Aug. 17, 1994); see also Hohn v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 943, 945-46 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (remanding, suna
sponte, a removed case in which compensatory damages exceeded $15,000 but fell short
of $50,000 and claims for punitive damages were "wholly unquantified and ambiguous"
and were "based upon probabilities, surmise, or guesswork').
141 Cadek No. 93 C 1402, 1994 WL 449284, at *3.
' Id. (citing Loehrke v. Wanta Builders, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Wis. Ct App.
1989)).
143 Id. at *1.
'"Id.
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The judge found that these facts did not justify plaintiff's conclusions
and could not be characterized as wanton and willful' 45 As a result,
punitive damages were not available and could not be used to reach the
jurisdictional amount on a claim involving $45,000 in compensatory
damages.1
46
Gober v. Allstate Insurance Company'47 was similarly decided and
offers a mode of analysis that would be highly instructive to a Supreme
Court willing to reevaluate the Bell rule.
Gober filed a complaint in a Mississippi county court alleging
negligence and bad faith in Allstate's denial of an insurance claim. The
plaintiff claimed actual damages of $10,000, the uninsured motorist limit
under the policy, and requested unspecified punitive damages.'" By
statute, the county court had jurisdiction over cases "wherein the amount
of value of the thing in controversy shall not exceed, exclusive of costs
and interest, the sum of [$50,000]."''
Defendant Allstate removed the case to federal court, claiming that
its liability could exceed $50,000 based on the plaintiff's demand for
punitive damages. 50 The District Court ordered the case remanded.''
The removal statute "must be construed narrowly to limit federal
jurisdiction and avoid undue encroachment on a state's right to adjudicate
a case filed in one of its courts."'' Defendant's efforts to show that
liability could exceed $50,000 by citing recent examples of bad faith
145 Id. at *3.
'4 See id. (seeking $45,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive
damages). On facts of this kind, counsel's strategy should include a FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under existing state punitive
damages law, accompanied by a FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) dismissal motion for lack of
jurisdiction based on striking punitive damages from jurisdictional calculations; see also
Furman & Halpern, P.C. v. Nexgen Software Corp., No. CWIA.93-CV-2788, 1994 WL
287795, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1994) (dismissing the case for lack of jurisdictional
amount because granting summary judgment on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim
eliminated the legal basis for punitive damages).
'4 855 F. Supp. 158, 162 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (remanding case to state court because
defendant failed to establish jurisdiction by not meeting the amount-in-controversy
requirement).
'" Id. at 159.
4 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-9-21 (1972) (describing cases over which Mississippi's
county courts have jurisdiction).
0 Gober, 855 F. Supp. at 159. Allstate apparently took the position that county court
verdicts could exceed $50,000 but judgments on these verdicts could be entered only for
amounts that did not exceed that figure. Id. at 161 n.4.
.. Id. at 162.
'2 Id. at 159.
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punitive damage awards above that figure were unavailing.'53 It was
"mere speculation" that damages would exceed $5 0,000 .1" Accordingly,
doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of nonremovabi-
lity.'" To grant removal in Gober's case would be no more than
"'poaching on the hunting grounds of a coordinate judicial system
"'156
The Gober decision seeks to protect both federal and state court
jurisdiction by imposing strict requirements on a defendant's application
for the removal of a state case. It recognizes that federal subject matter
jurisdiction is limited. Such limits must have meaning if court resources
are to be protected and healthy federalism promoted. 7 An approach
similar to Gober should be taken to modem diversity jurisdiction.
Because punitive damages are inherently speculative, they should be
unavailable as a means of access to federal courts, both horizontally 5'
and vertically.'5 9
I. PUNmVE DAMAGES: A BESIEGED REMEDY
Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Society is an application of the Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins'6 principle that federal courts must follow state
substantive law in the determination of diversity cases.'6' Therefore, to
the extent that punitive damages are a recoverable state law remedy for
the plaintiff's injuries, federal court judges and juries must assess and
"' Id. at 161.
"S Id.
u Id. at 162.
16 Id. at n.6 (quoting Robinson v. Quality Ins. Co., 633 F. Supp. 572, 577 (S.D. Ala.
1986)).
17 See Lindsay v. Kvortek, 865 F. Supp. 264, 267-70, 267 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1994)
(refusing to accept punitive damage claims amounting to $40,000 for "abdominal and
back pain, menstrual difficulty, and a bruise to... [the] knee, as well as shock, fright and
distress resulting from an automobile accidenV').
... See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) (discussing requirements for federal diversity
cases).
.. See, e.g., id. § 1441 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (describing actions removable to
federal court).
'6o 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6 Id. at 78.
The right to recover punitive damages is deeply rooted in the jurisprudence of the
United States and is nearly universally recognized by the laws or court decisions of the
states. See, e.g., GEORGE W. FIELD, LAW OF DAMAGES 66 n.5 (1876) (describing how
widespread awards of punitive damages are in England and the United States); Michael
Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes
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review such damages pursuant to systems set up by state law." This
manifestation of Erie does not extend to federal court analysis of the
amount in controversy component of diversity jurisdiction. The existence
of diversity jurisdiction, including the standard to be followed and its
application to the facts, is purely a matter of federal law.'"
Under this model, federal courts are inevitably burdened with the
multiple legal and policy problems created by the remedy of punitive
damages'65 and the procedural complexities of state punitive damages
systems.'" Striking punitive damage claims from jurisdictional amount
calculations and returning cases involving mostly punitive damages to the
states will save the federal courts from some of these burdens.
During the past several years, punitive damage awards have generated
intense criticism." Judges,'" business leaders, 69  scholars, legisla-
with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2 nm.6-7 and accompanying text (1992)
(discussing the long history of punitive damages in American and English jurisprudence
and the reasons for their imposition).
" See supra note 43 (noting that under Erie, federal courts sitting in diversity must
apply the substantive law of the state, including state punitive damages principles relating
to standards of proof, formulae for recoverable amounts, and procedures (Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938)); supra notes 88-159 and accompanying text (analyzing
cases where federal courts apply state punitive damages laws).
1'64 Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352-53 (1961) (holding that
determination of the value of the matter in controversy "is a federal question to be
decided under federal standards").
6 See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
'"See infra notes 179-223 and accompanying text.
'7 See generally Rustad, supra note 162, at 1-24.
" See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1991) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) ("Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. ... Imposed indiscriminately
... they have a devastating potential for harm.... Juries are permitted to target
unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and redistribute wealth.
Multimillion dollar losses are inflicted on a whim.").
'" See, e.g., Letter from Lee R. Raymond, Chairman, Exxon Corporation, to New
York Times (Sept. 27, 1994), reprinted in N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1994 (asserting that the
five billion dollar punitive damages award in the Exxon Valdez oil spill case constituted
a "ruinous verdict").
'70 See Report, supra note 22, at 778-83 (urging Congress to limit diversity
jurisdiction to complex multi-state litigation, interpleader, and suits involving aliens). See
generally E. Jeffrey Grube, Punitive Damages, A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
839 (1993) (arguing that the state, not civil plaintiffs, should be awarded punitive
damages); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That has
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1984) (advocating complete abolishment
of the punitive damages concept or else stringent limitations); Victor E. Schwartz & Mark
A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform - State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the
Challenge Issued by the Suipreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REv.
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tots' and politicians" have attacked these damages. Such criticisms
demonstrate that diversity cases based on punitive damages exacerbate the
general problems caused by federal court diversity jurisdiction' by
intensifying the burdens on federal courts trying state law cases 74 and
restricting the courts' capacity to decide federal law cases. 5
A. Policy Objections to Punitive Damages
The reform proposed by this Article is not premised on the correct-
ness or provability of criticisms of punitive damages. Rather, the very
existence of the punitive damages debate supports the reform proposed
by the Article.
The major policy criticisms of punitive damages are the following:
(1) Punitive damages are economically destructive to American
business.'76
1365 (1993) (advocating state legislative initiatives to curb punitive damages - ie.,
changing burdens of proof, bifurcating trials so that the determination of punitive damages
is separate from trial, and making compliance with regulatory standards a defense to a
punitive damages claim).
17 See, e.g., Access to Justice Act of 1992, supra note 4.
in See, e.g., Quayle, supra note 5, at 564-65; President's Council on Competitiveness,
Agenda for Civil JusticeReform in America 22-23 (Aug. 1991) (reprinted at42 AM. U. L. REV.
1761 (1993)) (recommending several reforms in the awarding of punitive damages);
Republicans Take Aim at Punitive Damages in ProductLiability Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
27, 1994, at 20 (reporting that Republicans are proposing national legislation to limit punitive
damages by capping awards at three times actual damages, barring product liability lawsuits
against retailers and distributors, and prohibiting punitive damages against makers of drugs
approved by the FDA and airplanes approved by the FAA). "Recently the House of
Representatives passed broad legislation limiting punitive damage recoveries in state and federal
courts .... The Senate went along with caps on punitive damage recoveries only in products
liability cases," but the President has said that he will veto the Senate limits. Paul S. Edelman,
Tort Reform and Maritime Law, N.Y. L.J., May 30, 1995, at 3.
' See supra notes 22-45 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 23-24, 34-39, and 42-45 and accompanying text.
17s See supra notes 25, 40-41 and accompanying text.
176 It is broadly asserted that punitive damages harm the American economy. Punitive
damage awards are said to be anti-competitive because added costs (i.e., increases in
insurance premiums, attorney's fees, public relations expenditures, and inspection/product
testing) place American companies at a disadvantage in the domestic and world
economies. See Quayle, supra note 5, at 561 n.12 and accompanying text (survey of over
250 American companies showed more than three quarters of executives believe that
American products will be disadvantaged in world markets without tort/product liability
reform); see also Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 170, at 1371 & nn.37-38 (discussing
how the uncertainty of punitive damages law in the United States disadvantages American
businesses with regard to foreign competitors); Rustad, supra note 162, at 20 (asserting
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(2) Punitive damages result in windfall recoveries for plaintiffs'"
that American manufacturers perceive a competitive disadvantage against European and
Japanese companies, which operate in systems that exclude punitive damages).
For example, it is reported that the insurance costs of foreign manufacturers are
twenty to fifty percent lower than comparable costs for American companies. Quayle,
supra note 5, at 561 n.11 and accompanying text (citing American Textile Mach. Assn.,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Cooperative Agreement No. 99-26-07151-10, An International
Suy ofProduct Liability Costs and Systems For Five Domestic Manufacturing Industries
299 (1984)); see also S. REP. No. 215, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 9 (1991) (discussing how
insurers do not discount premiums for exports, making them less competitive).
It is argued that civil damage awards, including punitive damages, can drive up the
prices of American products and force American businesses out of many markets. Quayle,
supra note 5, at 561; see also H.R. REP. No. 748, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 23
(1988) (discussing how the current products liability system impedes America's
competitiveness). The threat and reality of constant litigation, especially the specter of
punitive damages, can discourage the development of new products, Quayle, supra note
5, at 561; see also Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 170, at 1371-72 nn.39-40 (reporting
that companies ceased research on possible HIV vaccine because of fears of liability),
create a disincentive for innovation and experimentation, Quayle, supra note 5, at 561;
see also E. Patrick McGuire, The Conference Bd., Res. Rep. No. 908, The Impact of
Product Liability, 6, 22 (1988), and invite foreign business, supported by government
subsidies and relatively free from exposure to lawsuits, to accelerate the development and
marketing of new or better products desired by world consumers. Cf. Michael Rustad &
Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the
Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1309-11 n.193 (1993) (arguing that punitive
damages deter high risk corporate behavior, "shield" the public from excessive profit
taking, and deter premature marketing of improperly tested and, thus, potentially
dangerous products). Ultimately, it is asserted that punitive damages awards may force
American companies into bankruptcy or out of business while simultaneously penalizing
the consuming public. See, e.g., Sales & Cole, supra note 170, at 1154-55 (describing the
effect of asbestos litigation in driving manufacturers into bankruptcy). American
companies have refused to market the French abortion medicine, R.U. 486, in the past
because of fears concening litigation. Gary M. Samuelson, Commentary, DES, RU-486,
and Dejavu, 2 J. PHARMAcy AND L. 56, 70 (1993) (discussing why American companies
would refuse to market RU-486 even if the FDA ban was lifted).
" This criticism targets perceived inherent contradictions in the theory and practice
of punitive damages systems. Punitive damages purportedly serve a quasi-criminal
purpose by punishing the defendant see, e.g., Rustad, supra note 162, at 2-3 n.7 (tracing
the history of punitive damages and summarizing basic goals for egregious, malicious,
wiul wanton, oppressive, or outrageous behavior), deterring others from engaging in
similar reckless or dangerous conduct, see, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) (describing motives for awarding
punitive damages); Gunbe, supra note 170, at 845 n.22 (declaring that the only legitimate
purpose of punitive damages is to deter conduct), and educating society about communal
expectations regarding responsible individual and corporate action, see, e.g., Rustad &
Koenig, supra note 176, at 1291 nn.112-14 (noting a case where punitive damages were
imposed for "example's sake"). Punitive damages theory occupies a middle ground
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between the purely criminal (loss of liberty as the ultimate sanction) and purely civil
(monetary damages to compensate for losses combined with equitable relief to fully
remedy the plaintiff's injuries) models. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of
Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705, 705 (1989) (noting that punitive damages
inhabit "a strange border land between civil and criminal law"); id. at 708-13 (discussing
punitive damages in the context of individual freedoms). At the heart of punitive damage
systems is the payment of such damages to a private citizen, the plaintiff. To many, this
party receives a windfall recovery that is totally unrelated to the goals and justifications
for punitive damages. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 74 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing how punitive damages are essentially windfalls to the
plaintiffs); see generally Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff's Windfall from
Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1903 (1992) (asserting that the
goals of punishment and deterrence cannot be fully met if plaintiff is the payee).
Some critics assert that the goals of punitive damages cannot be achieved if the
plaintiff is the payee. See, e.g., Grube, supra note 170, at 841 (asserting that plaintiffs are
not entitled to windfalls). It is proposed that all or part of a punitive damages award be
paid to the state. See generally Randall H. Endo, Punitive Damages in Hawaii: Curbing
Unwarranted Expansion, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 659, 680 (1991) (proposing payment of
punitive damages to the state to deter and punish defendants and test the sincerity of
plaintiffs' claims); Brian M. English, Note, Oliver v. Raymark: Holding the Line on
Punitive Damages, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 63, 71 (1988) (reviewing criticisms of
awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff in strict products liability actions); Sonja
Larsen, Annotation, Validiy, Construction and Application of Statutes Requiring that
Percentage of Punitive Damages Award be Paid Directly to State or Court Administered
Fund, 16 A.L.R. 5th 129 (1993) (summarizing court rulings on the constitutionality of
statutes compelling plaintiffs to remit punitive damage awards to a state or court fund, or
to channel awards to a socially responsible recipient such as nonprofit or public interest
organizations). At least eight states have passed laws requiring payment of some portion
of punitive damages into state or state sponsored funds. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
102(4) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE § 668A.1(2)
(b) (1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(2) (1988); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 8701
(McKinney Supp. 1993) (expired Apr. 1, 1994); OR. REV.. STAT. § 18.540(1) (1993); and
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992). Without laws like these, it is feared that plaintiffs
will be tempted to invent or inflate punitive damages claims, losing defendants will
escape the public condemnation that should inhere in quasi-criminal penalties, costs will
be passed along to the consuming public, and confidence in the legitimacy of the civil
justice system will be shaken. See, e.g., Endo, supra note 177, at 680.
As Justice Harlan noted, punitive damages systems result in "private fines levied for
purposes that [are] wholly unrelated to the circumstances of the actual litigant."
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 74. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that punitive damages are not excludable from taxable income under
§ 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code which does not tax "the amount of damages
received... on account of personal injuries or sickness" because punitive damages bear
no logical relationship to actual damages for personal injuries), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2576 (1995); Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 231 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (ruling that
punitive damages received by a taxpayer in a District of Columbia Human Rights Act
action are not excludable from gross income); Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586,
ELIMINATING PuNmnvI DAMAGE CLAIMS
(3) Punitive damages undermine public confidence in the civil justice
system.'
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590-91 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding punitive damages received by a taxpayer in a Maryland
defamation action includable in taxpayer's gross income).
Such systems invite distrust and misunderstanding. Of equal importance, these
systems can be unreliable. Studies ofpostverdict review of punitive damages awards show
that such awards are frequently reduced or reversed. Rustad, supra note 162, at 54-55
(presenting empirical studies of non-asbestos verdicts from 1965 through 1990 in which
nearly one-third of punitive verdicts were reversed or remitted by appellate courts).
Professor Rustad asserts that "[a] greater number of non-asbestos verdicts involved
reversals or reductions of punitive damages than affirmances." See id. at 55 (cited with
approval in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2341 n.11 (1994)); see also
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages Regulation,
REG. SeptiOct. 1986, at 33, 35-36 (presenting findings that federal appeals courts
reversed and remanded a majority of appealed punitive damage awards in product liability
cases. Data on state cases was even more compelling. only two percent of 199 appealed
cases were upheld.). Id. at 36. Plaintiffs overwhelmingly settle post-trial rather than
submit punitive damage awards to appellate court scrutiny. Rustad, supra note 162, at 55
(noting settlement rates at 36% to 39%). Plaintiffs rarely collect the fall amount of
punitive damage verdicts. Id. at 57 (median punitive damages collected for appealed and
settled cases is a small fraction - ten to fifteen percent - of the original award).
'- See Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort
Law, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1385, 1386-88 (1987) (discussing criticism of punitive
damages).
Avariety of explanations are given for this "loss of confidence" criticism. Onamore
technical level, punitive damages may destabilize the civil trial process by lowering or
eliminating a plaintiffs incentive to settle. See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 170, at
1371 n.36 and accompanying text. The very unpredictability of a jury's appraisal of a
punitive damage claim can tempt a plaintiff to hold out for a large verdict and may invite
defendants to rely on post-trial motions to undo punitive damage awards rather than
reaching an early settlement. Id. There is a sense that this makes civil litigation a "game"
instead of a rationally-structured search for truth and justice. As punitive damages shift
the purposes of civil trials from compensation and redress of injury to punishment and
deterrence, Americans become confused by the process and distrust its results. See, e.g.,
President's Council on Competitiveness, supra note 172, at 22-23 (referring to the
consequences of a system in which damage awards are random, arbitrary, and capricious,
and disproportionate to underlying harms).
The variability, generality, and ambiguity of state law standards for punitive
damages, see supra notes 88-159 and accompanying text, also lead to public perceptions
that punitive damage awards are arbitrary, capricious, and emotionally driven. See, e.g.,
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2729 (1993) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he risk of prejudice, bias, and caprice remains a real one [in punitive
damages cases because] juries sometimes receive only vague or amorphous guidance
[which] heightens the risk that arbitrariness, passion, or bias will replace dispassionate
deliberation as the basis for the jury's verdict.); see also WALKER K. OLSON, THE
LrrxGATION EXPLOSION 175 (1991) (stating that the frequent judicial reduction of jury
verdicts "is a sign of distress in the legal system"). This is especially true when state law
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B. Constitutional Challenges to Punitive Damages
Beyond policy objections to punitive damages, a more serious set of
problems for federal courts arises from constitutional challenges to state
punitive damage systems. Under Erie'79 and Bell,8' federal courts
sitting in diversity must follow complex state systems for the trial and
appellate review of punitive damage claims.' They must ensure that
these systems conform to various constitutional requirements imposed by
the United States Supreme Court." Federal courts must also anticipate
state appellate decisions on the validity of "reformed" state punitive
damage laws.' These expensive, time-consuming, and sovereignty-
compromising federal court tasks provide strong support for a narrowing
of federal court jurisdiction of diversity cases based on punitive damag-
es. 18
United States Supreme Court decisions impose varied and significant
constitutional limits on punitive damage awards.' The Court has
determined that the Constitution places substantive limits on punitive
damage awards 8 ' and requires that detailed procedural protections be
fails to require some proportionality between the amounts of actual and punitive damages
awards.
State law forces state punitive damages policies and systems on federal courts,
exposing them to potential public condemnation of punitive damage awards. Screening
out state diversity of citizenship cases built predominantly on punitive damage claims will
at least spare the federal courts the growing public discomfort with allegedly runaway
punitive damage awards.
1- Supra note 160.
0 Supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
... Supra note 162-163.
" See infra notes 185-223 and accompanying text.
113 See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
18 The central thesis of this Article is that diversity of citizenship cases structured
around punitive damage claims represent an extreme manifestation of the burdens
imposed on the federal courts by this jurisdiction. The potential for and reality of abuse
of federal jurisdiction, at the expense of more essential federal court functions, should be
eliminated. It should be noted, however, that eliminating punitive damage claims from
jurisdictional amount calculations will still leave the federal courts with jurisdiction over
diversity cases in which non-punitive damages exceed the jurisdictional amount.
Nonetheless, the incremental reform achieved by removing this area of misuse of federal
court jurisdiction is required and may lead to the adoption of other remedial measures.
See, e.g., supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text (outlining various reform. pro-
posals).
... See, e.g., Seabord Air Line Ry. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907) (asserting
that there are "limits beyond which [judicially imposed] penalties may not go").
"16 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994) (citing Pacific Mut. Life
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afforded parties to a civil action in which punitive damages are
sought.
187
In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.," a majority of
the Court concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment did not apply to punitive damage awards in civil cases involving pri-
vate parties.'8 ' However, it presaged later cases by stating in dicta
that the issue of "whether due process acts as a check on undue jury
discretion to award punitive damages in the absence of any express
statutory limit," would be considered by the Court if properly present-
ed. 19
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip9' met the issue head-on.
Justice Blackmun, who wrote the opinion in Browning-Ferris, concluded
for the Court's majority that the common law method"9 for imposing
punitive damage awards did not, by itsel constitute a violation of Four-
teenth Amendment due process. 3
Although no "mathematical bright line"' ' test was imposed, the Haslip
court sanctioned broad constitutional review ofpunitive damage awards, both
in amount and procedural context. 5 The constitutional inquiry is whether
there are sufficient checks on jury and judicial discretion in awarding
punitive damages."'6 On a case-by-case basis, the Haslip analysis requires
a review of the following: the accuracy of jury instructions;97 the substan-
tive guidance provided by state punitive damages standards; 9 post-trial
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
"' Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18-22 (1991) (detailing how
Alabama's procedural safeguards were sufficient in the award of punitive damages in that
case).
492 U.S. 257 (1989).
1I9 Id. at 260.
'9 Id. at 276-77. The court stated that the "petitioners made no claim that the
proceedings themselves were unfair, or that the jury was biased or blinded by emotion or
prejudice!." Id. at 276.
'9' 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
L9 Under the common law method, "the amount of the punitive award [is] ...
determined by a jury instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter
similar wrongful conduct." Id. at 15. This jury determination "is then reviewed by trial
and appellate courts to ensure that it is reasonable." Id.
"'Id. at 17-18; see supra note 190 and accompanying text.
'' Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
m Id. at 18-24.
"Id. at 18.
"'Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
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review procedures;'99 and a comparison of compensatory to punitive
damages? °0
IXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.2"' presented a
compelling due process challenge to punitive damages. A West Virginia jury
awarded $19,000 in actual damages and $10 million in punitive damages for
TXOs bad faith claims to Alliance Resources' oil and gas development
rights.02 A plurality of the United States Supreme Court refused to find this
award, in which punitives were 526 times greater than actual damages, to be
"grossly excessive.""0 3 Justice Stevens stressed that punitive damages may
be invalid under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause."
However, the damages awarded by this july were rendered by procedures
conforming to Haslip's trial and post-trial due process requirements2 5 The
damages were factually reasonable considering "the amount of money
potentially at stake, the bad faith of [TXO], the fact that the scheme employed
in this case was part of a larger pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit, and
[JXOs] wealth.!20 6
The jury in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg 7 awarded the plaintiff
$919,390.39 in compensatory and $5 million in punitive damages for injuries
suffered in an accident involving a Honda all-tenain vehicle? 8 The Court,
' Id. at 20.
Id. at 23. Haslhp involved an award of approximately $840,000 in punitive and
$200,000 in compensatory damages ($4000 in out-of-pocket expenses) because an
insurance company employee converted plaintiff's insurance premiums eventually causing
a lapse of medical insurance coverage. Id. at 6-7 n.2. The Court found that the
procedures followed in this case met due process "concerns of reasonableness and
adequate guidance from the court," and constrained this jury's discretion in awarding
punitive damages. Id. at 18, 23. As applied to the facts, punitive damages that were four
times the amount of compensatory damages were "close to the line" required for reversal.
Id. at 23.
201 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (holding that punitive damages awards do not violate due
process).
' See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Allied Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 875 (W. Va.)
(affirming an award for $10,000,000 in punitive damages), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 594
(1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993). TXO used a worthless quitclaim deed to attempt
renegotiation of TXO's royalty arrangements with Alliance. Affiance asserted a "slander
of title" claim based on TXO's false claim of title. Id. at 877-78.
203 TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2722-23.
2 Id. at 2720.
0' Supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
2 TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2722.
2' 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994) (holding that Oregon's constitutional prohibition ofjudicial
review of punitive damages is unconstitutional).
m Id. at 2334.
ELIMINAING PUNTrrIVE DAMAGE CLAIMS
in another opinion by Justice Stevens and over a strong dissent by Justice
Ginsberg, reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and set aside the punitive
damages award on constitutional grounds.0
An unusual amendment to the Oregon Constitution,10 as interpreted
and applied by the Oregon courts, prohibited trial and appellate court review
of the amount of punitive damages" The amendment was construed to
mean that Oregon courts were barred from setting aside such awards as
excessive.?
This absence of meaningful review of the size of a punitive damage
verdict was held to violate Fourteenth Amendment due process.213
"[U]nreviewable power by [the] jury" is the core constitutional vice identified
in Haslip and TXO.2 4 Justice Stevens found Oregon's system of checks on
jury discretion, including verdicts set aside for errors injury instructions, lack
of any evidence to support the verdict, and awards exceeding amount of
punitive damages claimed in the complaint, constitutionally inadequate.2 5
A complete absence of judicial review of the amount of punitive damages
awarded by a july made it impossible to test a jury verdict under the
Haslip/TXO reasonableness standard216  Therefore, an overwhelming
Supreme Court majority declared the system unconstitutional.2"7
A case-by-case due process analysis of punitive damages under the
Haslip/TXO/Honda Motor formula218 may be sound constitutional law and
effective public policy. The very necessity of such analysis, however, supports
the reform of federal court diversity jurisdiction proposed in this Article. State
law cases based primarily on punitive damages compel federal courts to
follow increasingly complex trial and post-trial procedures.2 9 Elimination
2 Id. at 2342.
2
'0 OIL CONST. art. VII, § 3 (In actions at law... no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of this state, unless the court can affirmatively say
there is no evidence to support the verdict.").
2" See Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 210 P.2d 461, 462 (Or. 1949) (holding that
Supreme Court had no power to set aside a verdict on the ground of excessive damages).
212 Id. at 463; see Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. at 2338 (explaining the prior
holding).
213 Honda Motor Co., 114 S. Ct. at 2341.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
"
7 Id. Justice Stevens was joined in the majority opinion by Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Ginsburg was joined in dissent by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 2332.
" See supra notes 191-217 and accompanying text.
219 See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 162, at 7-8 n.24 (listing twenty-seven states that
require clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the trial
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of such cases from federal court jurisdiction will save federal judicial and
financial resources.
In addition to United States Supreme Court constitutional review of
punitive damage trials, federal courts must also, under Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, anticipate state court challenges to "state-reformed" sys-
tems"0 and apply state court precedents to both jurisdictional and
remedial issues. Several state appellate courts have ruled on federal
constitutional challenges to legislation requiring the payment of punitive
damages into state funds or state-sponsored funds.2 Due process, equal
protection, unlawful taking, and excessive fines theories may be advanced
in state courts.' State constitutional law attacks cannot be far off.
Thus, punitive damage systems generate extensive constitutional
litigation, imposing increasingly heavy burdens on federal courts and
compounding the stresses created by diversity jurisdiction.
ill. BELL'S TOLL: DivEasrrY JURISDICTION
BASED ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES PLACES SPECIAL AND
UNJUSTIFIED BURDENS ON THE FEDERAL COURTS
State legislative and judicial reform of punitive damages systems
provide additional reasons for eliminating punitive damages from federal
court jurisdictional amount calculations. These reforms greatly complicate
the procedures for trial and appellate review of punitive damage claims.
In fact, the law of punitive damages that federal courts must now follow
has come to closely resemble state criminal law.
A majority of American states have raised the standard of proof
required for recovery of punitive damages. Some twenty-four states have
evidentiary standard); id. at 9 n.27 (discussing bifurcated trials); id. at 9 n.28 (discussing
judge assessed punitive damages).
20 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1937) (stating that federal courts have no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state).
ra See, e.g., Kirk v. Denver Post, 818 P.2d 262, 273 (Colo. 1991) (invalidating a
statute requiring plaintiffs to remit one-third of punitive damage awards to the state as
violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
2" See supra notes 201-21 and accompanying text.
22 See generally Ronald K.L. Collins et al., State High Courts, State Constitutions,
and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 13 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 599, 600 (1986) (exploring the reaction of state court judges to the trend towards
recognizing greater protection for individual rights claims); Russell G. Murphy, The Role
of Massachusetts State Constitutional Law in Litigation Strategies for the Trial of Drunk
Driving Cases Under the "Safe Roads Act" of 1986, 72 MASS. L. REv. 120, 120 (1987)
(describing the emergence of state constitutional law as a source of procedural rights for
criminal defendants).
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adopted a minimum "clear and convincing evidence test" and eleven more
require proof of malice.' States have enacted laws requiring such
' See Quayle, supra note 5, at 565; Jewell Hargleroad, Comment, Punitive Damages:
T7e Burden of Proof Required by Procedural Due Process, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 99, 101-02
(1987) (supporting a clear and convincing evidence standard); see also Rustad, supra note
162, at 7 n.24 (listing standards on a state-by-state basis). ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (Supp.
1992); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Supp. 1992); CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp.
1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5(3) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(b) (West
Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1
(West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3701(c) - 3702(c) (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.184 (Michie/Bobbs Merrill 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 5549.20(1) (West Supp.
1995); id. § 5549.20(a) (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (1993); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 42005(1) (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.80 (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9A (West 1987); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.925(1) (1993); S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN. § 21-1-4.1 (1987); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-18-191(a) (1992). Six states have established the standard through case law.
Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986) (holding that
punitive damages were not warranted due to lack of evil mind), superceded by statute on
other grounds, Newman v. Sun Valley Crushing Co., 844 P.2d 623, 627-28 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992); Masald v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 575 (Haw. 1989) (stating that
clear and convincing evidence is the standard of proof for punitive damages); Ragsdale
v. K-Mart Corp., 468 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a claim for
punitive damages must be supported by clear and convincing evidence); Tuttle v.
Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1362-63 (Me. 1985) (holding that malice is necessary for
punitive damages); Owens-Illinois Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 657 (Md. 1992) (stating
that a clear and convincing standard of proof is necessary to insure that punitive damages
are properly awarded); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 458 (Wis. 1980)
(adopting a middle standard for the burden of proof in punitive damage claim).
Eleven states require proof of malice. Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-653.02-.03 (1992)
(requiring actual malice for punitive damages in libel or slander claims); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3294(a) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that punitive damages are proper for breach of a
noncontractual obligation, since it requires a finding of fraud, oppression or malice); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6855 (Supp. 1992) (requiring malice in a health care malpractice
action); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-1-221 (1993) (requiring actual malice or actual fraud);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.337 (1991) (making actual malice necessary in a libel or slander
action); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-5(1) (West 1987) (making oppression, fraud or malice
necessary in a non-contractual obligation action); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-007 (Supp.
1993) (requiring oppression, fraud or malice for non-contractual obligation action); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2315-21 (Anderson 1991) (stating that acts or omissions require
malice, aggravated or egregious fraud, oppression or insult to merit punitive damages);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-29.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994) (requiring that conduct be motivated by
malice); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-1-4.1 (1987) (requiring willful, wanton, or
malicious conduct by defendant); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52 (Michie 1992) (requiring
willful or wanton conduct that shows disregard for the safety of others). Maine and
Maryland case law requires proof of malice. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1362-63
(Me. 1985) (requiring proof of malice); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zendba, 601 A.2d 633, 657
(Md. 1992) (stating that actual malice must be shown by clear and convincing evidence
to award punitive damages).
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measures as bifurcated trials;z judicial assessment of punitive damages
after jury determination of liability;,2 6 fixed ratio ceilings on punitive
awards;2 7 damage caps; 38 and payment of punitive damages into
state funds or state-sponsored funds.'
The United States Supreme Court ruling in Honda Motor makes
appellate review of punitive damages awards a constitutional necessi-
ty."3 State court and legislative standards and systems for review
dramatically complicate the job of federal courts by injecting them into
detailed and time consuming procedures."3 As noted previously, the
Erie doctrine requires that recently reformed state standards and
procedures on punitive damages be applied by federal judges.' These
state systems have become sophisticated, complex, and multi-layered;
they have also become expensive, time consuming, and subject to
error 33
Independent federal trial and appellate procedures further encumber
trials and appeals in federal court. Rulings on motions for a remittitur or
' Separate trials for compensatory and punitive damages claims. Rustad, supra note
162, at 9 n.27 (listing states that require some type of divided, two stage proceeding for
the assessment of punitive damages).
Id. at n.28 (noting three states that have adopted judge-assessed punitive damages).
E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987) (limiting punitive damages to the
amount of actual damages except under certain circumstances); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73
(West Supp. 1995) (stating that "the total amount of punitive damages awarded to a
claimant may not exceed three times the amount of compensatory damages"); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (West Supp. 1995) (imiting punitive damages to
four times the amount of actual damages or $200,000, whichever is greater, except under
certain circumstances).
z' See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(1) (Supp. 1994) (making a $250,000 cap); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-3.8.1 (Michie 1992) (making a $250,000 cap); see also Haslip, 499
U.S. at 20 n.9 (1991); Edith Greene, Juror's Attitudes About Civil Litigation and Size of
Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 805, 806 (1991) (presenting a study on the effect
of tort reform publicity on jurors); Rustad, supra note 162, at 8 n.25 (listing states which
limit punitive damages awards).
' See Rustad, supra note 162, at 8 n.26 (listing eight states with state or state-
sponsored funds).
,' Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2332, 2332 (1994).
231 See, e.g., Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 513 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
evidence did not warrant a jury charge for punitive damages), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1063 (1994); Ross v. Black & Decker, 977 F.2d 1178, 1183 (1992) (stating that a $10
million punitive damages award was excessive in a products liability case), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993); Eichenur v. Reserve Life Ins., 934 F.2d 1377, 1378 (5th Cir.
1991) (ITihe instant case has bounced through the federal courts like a yo-yo on a long
string.").
" Supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
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new trial must be made under federal standards that are independent of
Erie-based punitive damages review.' United States Courts of Appeals
and Supreme Court review encompasses these rulings as well as trial
court decisions on jurisdiction ab initio,' trial court compliance with
state substantive and procedural requirements for punitive awards, 6
application of state court appellate procedures for review of punitive
damage verdicts,' 7 and de novo evaluation of the entire process under
the federal constitutional requirements of Haslip, TXO and Honda
Motor.
Thus, attempts to minimize the dangers of punitive damages as a
remedy and to immunize such awards from constitutional attack have the
incidental but inevitable effect of imposing new and unjustified burdens
on federal courts sitting in diversity.
CONCLUSION: ADOPTING A NEW RULE
Two routes exist to achieve the modest and narrow change in
federal court jurisdiction proposed by this Article. Congress could
enact a redrafted federal diversity of citizenship jurisdictional stat-
ute that would expressly prohibit the pleading of punitive damage
claims to satisfy the jurisdictional amount.3 9 The Access to Justice
FED. R. CIV. P. 59; see also Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1067
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that a trial court must make independent federal review of a
jury's answers to special questions and apply state law on punitive damages to a request
for remittitur on amounts awarded), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 21
F.3d 1238, 1250 (2d Cir.), cert. granted and vacated, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994); Eichenur,
934 F.2d at 1382 n.7 (holding that state law determines when a punitive damages award
is too high or too low); Browning Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279
(1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to
punitive damages awards in cases between private parties).
" A trial court's grant or denial of jurisdiction can be challenged by a timely motion
to dismiss, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), or by a motion for summary judgment, FED. R. Civ.
P. 56, on the grounds that the jurisdictional amount is not satisfied. See, e.g., Iowa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. La Plante, 480 U.S. 9, 19-20 (1987) (stating that the Court of Appeals should
not have affirmed the District Court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction);
D'Amato v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 958 F.2d 361, 361 (1992) (affirming
the District Court's grant of a motion to dismiss).
236 See supra note 163.
23 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 185-217 and accompanying text; see also Packard v. Provident
Nat'lBank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1043 (3d Cir.) (dismissing trust beneficiaries' suit for punitive
damages), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 440 (1993).
39 See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text (discussing Bell v. Preferred Life
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Act24 would have made this change, 4' along with other proposed
reforms. 42 Its defeat, the unwillingness of sponsors to resubmit similar
legislation,uO and the long history of legislative inertia on recommen-
dations like those contained in the Report of the Federal Court Study
Committee" suggest that Congress will not pass a revised diversity
statute in the near future241
In the alternative, the Supreme Court of the United States may revisit
the policy established in Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Society' On
a technical matter of federal court jurisdiction, reversal of prior precedent
is clearly available. 47 Bell is a judicially created rule of statutory
Assurance Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238 (1943)).
': Access to Justice Act of 1992, supra note 4.
4' The critical language of the Act provided that § 1332 of Title 28 would be
amended to read "(d) In determining whether a controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$50,000 ... punitive or exemplary damages ... shall not be included." Access to Justice
Act of 1992, H.R. 4155, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), at 3.
24 See supra notes 4-6.
243 Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
4 Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
24 The political climate of the post-1994 congressional elections period may change
this conclusion. Proposals by the new Republican legislative majority for "liability-
reform" legislation limit punitive damage awards to the higher of three times the actual
damages or $250,000, immunize retailers and distributors from product liability/punitive
damage suits, and bar punitive awards against the makers of drugs previously approved
by the FDA. Republicans Take Aim, supra note 172, at 20.
More importantly, a nine judge panel of the Judicial Conference of the United Sates,
established in 1990, will state to Congress that anticipated increases in the civil and
criminal case loads of the federal courts requires, inter alia, the elimination of diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction in all cases except those in which state court prejudice can be
shown. The panel's draft report states that diversity cases constitute a "massive diversion
of Federal judge power" and should be essentially removed from federal jurisdiction.
Robert Pear, Judges Proposing to Narrow Access to Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
1994, at Al, B9.
See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). The Court will
reexamine prior holdings based on a "series of prudential and pragmatic considerations
designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule
of law" and will balance the "respective costs ofreaffirming and overruling a prior case."
Id. at 2808. The Court will ask "whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would
lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the
old rule no more than aremnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed
or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application
or justification." Id. at 2808-09 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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interpretation - that good faith punitive damage claims may be relied on
to satisfy amount-in-controversy requirements even if facially exces-
sive.' A rule that causes the kinds of problems presented in this
Article should be judicially abrogated.
These problems could not have been foreseen at the time Bell was
decided. More importantly, the decision in Bell was not premised on
legislative intent. Justice Black's opinion for the Court provided little
guidance on the reasons or justifications for the rule adopted. The only
citations supporting the proposition that "actual and punitive damages...
must be considered ... in determining [the] jurisdictional amount"249
under the diversity statute then in effect, were to the 1886 case of
Bary v. Edmunds,' and the 1897 decision in Scott v. Donald. 2
Neither, decision significantly relied on express or implied legislative
purpose.
Even if legislative policy was the basis for the Bell Court's decision,
the growth since 1943 of punitive damage remedies?3 and the multiple
problems associated therewith,' have eroded a justification based on
legislative intent. Significant weight should not be accorded Congress'
unwillingness to adopt the reforms of the Access to Justice Act or Federal
Court Study Report. Many of the reform proposals rejected by Congress
were politically charged 5 and unevenly supported. 6 Punitive dam-
ages as a jurisdictional issue was never fully isolated for consideration.
Far more controversial proposals 7 overshadow this matter and pre-
clude any decisive inferences of Congressional position on this question.
Therefore, either the Supreme Court or Congress should reexamine
and reverse the Bell rule. This small but important step will relieve
some of the pressures on federal courts sitting in diversity. It may also
promote broader discussion on the need for full-scale revision of diversity
of citizenship jurisprudence.
2 Supra notes 79-87.
2o Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943).
20 The Judiciary Act, ch. 2, 36 Stat. 1091, 1098; 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 80; and §§ 24, 80
of the Judicial Code. Bell, 320 U.S. at 239 nrl.
2" 116 U.S. 550, 560-61 (1886). Bell, 320 U.S. at 240 n.4.
165 U.S. 58, 89-90 (1897). Bell, 320 U.S. at 240 n.4.
2 See, e.g., supra notes 79-159 and accompanying text.
z See, e.g., supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., supra note 172 and accompanying text.
v' See, e.g., supra note 172 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 176-223 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
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